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Sachs: Mobile Health Innovation and Interagency Coordination

Mobile Health Innovation and Interagency
Coordination
Rachel E. Sachs*
An app that can tell when a phone's owner is having a seizure.' A device
that transforms a phone into a mobile EKG machine. 2 An app that helps
patients track their moles over time-and maybe alerts them when they
should see a doctor.3 Just a few years ago, these descriptions would have
sounded like science fiction. But each of these products is now available to
patients, and the mobile health industry is growing rapidly.' Even as of 2015,
there were well over 100,000 mobile health apps available for download,
with the market continuing to grow.5
The rapid expansion of the mobile health industry has opened up
tremendous possibilities for gathering and using personal health data to
discover new correlations and solve vexing problems of human illness.' It
has also begun to give patients unprecedented control over their own health
information.' But unlike most other healthcare technologies, mobile health
apps like those described above often operate in a comparatively lawless

* Rachel E. Sachs, JD, MPH, is an Associate Professor of Law at Washington University in
St. Louis. For their extremely thoughtful comments and suggestions in developing this paper,
I would like to thank Nicolas Terry and the many scholars who participated in the 2016
American Society of Law, Medicine, & Ethics Conference and the 2016 Loyola University
Chicago School of Law Annual Symposium on Health Law Policy.
1.
Kendall Morgan, There's An App for That, ELSEVIER (June 25, 2015),
https://www.elsevier.com/atlas/story/people/theresanappforthat.
2.
Jonah Comstock, AliveCor ECG gets FDA Clearance for Two More Algorithms,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/40089/alivecor-ecggets-fda-clearance-for-two-more-algorithms.
3.
OHSU Dermatology, What is MoleMapper?, OHSU HEALTHCARE (2017),
https://www.ohsu.edu/xd/health/services/dermatology/war-on-melanoma/mole-mapper.cfm.
4. Joshua A. Krisch, Questioningthe Value ofHealthApps, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/health-apps-provide-pictures-if-not-proof-ofhealth/?_r-0.
5.

Id.

6.
Doug Vogel et al., Mobile Health, 23 ELECTRONIC MARKETS 3, 3 (Feb. 6, 2013),
https://1ink.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12525-013-0121-y.
7.
Eric Topol, Coming Soon to a Health System Near You: Digitized, Democratized
Medicine, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL
MEMBERSHIP
Ass'N
(Apr.
27,
2016),
http://www.hfma.org/Leadership/Archives/2016/Spring/ComingSoon to_aHealth_
System Near You Digitized,_DemocratizedMedicine/.
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world, free from both innovation-promoting tools and regulatory
enforcement strategies used by most of the administrative agencies
traditionally operating in the healthcare space.'
Many scholars have considered the regulatory landscape around mobile
health technologies and argued for a different regulatory system, or used the
landscape to analyze the safety of mobile health applications or the privacy
of the data they gather.9 This essay expands this scholarly focus in two ways.
First, it focuses on the innovation incentives created by this legal framework,
a topic considered by few scholars. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
it focuses on the ways in which different administrative agencies with
different statutory responsibilities both do and should coordinate to promote
incentives for innovation in mobile health technologies.
Part I considers the ways in which traditional innovation incentives like
patents and FDA regulation fail to cover mobile health technologies in the
way that they cover traditional health care technologies. Part II goes on to
consider two key ways in which mobile health companies have adapted to
this novel regulatory environment-either by attempting to avoid regulation
or, alternatively, by embracing it. Part III shifts focus from the companies
responding to the innovation landscape to the administrative agencies setting
it. Specifically, Part III considers the ways in which agencies have begun to
coordinate their efforts in the mobile health space. How do-and how canthese agencies, which lack formally shared regulatory authority over the
innovation space, nonetheless cooperate to promote incentives for
innovation? Administrative law and health innovation scholars have begun
to consider this question more generally, and this essay extends the argument
to the mobile health space.
I.

THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE SURROUNDING MOBILE HEALTH
INNOVATION

Although mobile health technologies have great potential to change the

8.
Jordan Cohen & Joanne Hawana, Mobile Health Apps Continue to Make Headlines,
MINTz LEVIN (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:25 PM), https://wwwhealtwawpolicynatterscom

/2016/03/16/mobile-health-apps-continues-to-face-privacy-security-and-consumerprotection-issues/.
9.
See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173
(2014); Nathan G. Cortez, I. Glenn Cohen, & Aaron S. Kesselheim, FDA Regulation ofMobile
Health Technologies, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 372 (2014); Fazal Khan, The "Uberization" of
Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology's Impact on the
MedicalProfession, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 123 (2016); Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory
of Medical Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 117 (2016); Nicolas Terry & Lindsay F. Wiley,

Liability for Mobile Health and Wearable Technologies, 25
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(2016); Nicolas Terry, Will the Internet of Things Transform Healthcare?, 19
& TECH. L. 327 (2017).
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way in which health care is delivered, analyzed, and evaluated, the legal
landscape surrounding mobile health technologies differs significantly from
that surrounding other, more typical health care technologies. 0 This Part
considers the ways in which areas of law that traditionally operate to regulate
innovation in the medical technology space-patent law, FDA regulation,
and insurance coverage-fail to read on mobile health technologies.
For most health care technologies, innovation is channeled through a series
of different legal structures. Some of these legal structures are designed
explicitly to promote innovation, like intellectual property law," while others
are designed primarily to ensure the quality and accuracy of marketed
technologies, like FDA regulation and insurance coverage.1 2 Companies
producing drugs and traditional medical devices must contemplate each of
these legal regimes during the innovation process." However, for many
mobile health technologies, the situation has been reversed." These three
areas of law are largely inapplicable to mobile health in ways that affect the
pattern of innovation we see.
PatentLaw. - Current case law significantly limits the kinds of protection
that mobile apps could enjoy, particularly in contrast to those granted to
pharmaceuticals. Patent law is typically thought to play a key role in the
development of new pharmaceutical technologies." Due to the high costs of
discovering new drugs and lengthy period required to bring them through the
FDA approval process,' 6 pharmaceutical companies cite patent law as an

10.
Khan, supra note 9, at 141-43.
11.
See Heidi Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from
Health CareMarkets, 16 INNOVATION POL'Y AND THE ECON. 53, 53-54 (2016) ("Intellectual
property rights aim to increase private research investments in new technologies by allowing
inventors to capture a higher share of the social returns to their inventions.").
12.
Cortez, Cohen & Kesselheim, supranote 9, at 5; Melanie Cozad & Bruno Wichmann,
Efficiency of Health Care Delivery Systems: Effects of Health Insurance Coverage, 45
APPLIED
ECON.
4082,
4082-83
(2013),
http://www.tandfonfline.com/doi/abs/
10.1080/00036846.2012.750420.
13.
Khan, supra note 9, at 142-43.
14. Id. at 143.
15.
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1617 (2003); Benjamin N. Roin, UnpatentableDrugs and the StandardsofPatentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 508 (2009); BenjaninN. Roin, The Casefor TailoringPatentAwardsBased
on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLAL. REV. 672, 751 (2014).
16.
Compare Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the PharmaceuticalIndustry: New
EstimatesofR&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016) (placing the cost of developing a
new drug at $2.6 billion), with Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz, Jon Sussex and Adrian Towse, The
R&D Cost of a New Medicine, OFFICE OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1, 13, 16, 30 (estimating the
cost at $1.5 billion), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26928437. For my purposes,
there is sufficient agreement that drugs are among the most costly technological goods to
develop. See Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 426, 448-57 (2014).
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indispensable tool enabling them to protect their investments in new drugs.' 7
Most approved drugs are covered by a number of patents, which cover
different aspects of the drug at issue.' Core patents typically claim the drug
compound itself while secondary patents may cover methods of treatment
that use the drug, particular formulations ofthe drug, or the process of making
the drug.' 9
Recent developments in patent law have made it far more difficult for
mobile health app developers to achieve the same levels of patent protection
that exist in the pharmaceutical context.20 Specifically, in a series of cases
over the past few years, the Supreme Court limited the types of technologies
eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101,21 most recently deciding
2 2 CLS Bank had sought
Alice Corporation,Ltd. v. CLS Bank International.
a declaratory judgment that several of Alice's patents, directed toward
methods of mitigating settlement risk using computers,2 3 were invalid under
§ 101.24

Justice Thomas' majority opinion agreed that Alice's specific method
claims were invalid. 25 More important, though, was the way Justice Thomas
crystallized a two-step process for deciding § 101 cases. The process asks
first whether "the claims at issue are directed to [a] patent-ineligible
17.
Stuart J.H. Graham et. al., High Technology Entrepreneursand the PatentSystem:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1286 (2009);
Wesley Cohen et al., ProtectingTheir IntellectualAssets: AppropriabilityConditionsand Why
U.S. ManufacturingFirms Patent (Or Not) 2, 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7552, 2000).
18.
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many PatentsDoes It Take to Make A Drug?Followon PharmaceuticalPatents and UniversityLicensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
299, 300-01 (2010).
19. Amy Kapczynski, ChanPark, & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs andProdrugsand Salts
(Oh My!): An EmpiricalAnalysis of "Secondary"PharmaceuticalPatents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 1
(2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/joumal.pone.0049470.
20.
See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
21.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."). The
Supreme Court has articulated a number of specific exceptions to the broad text of § 101:
"[laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not eligible for patent protection.
See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); see also Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
22.
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (enbanc)
(Lourie, J., concurring) (per curiam).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1273-74 (discussing how the enbanc Federal Circuit splintered badly, with ten
judges issuing seven opinions, none commanding a majority).
25. Id. at 2352 (holding further that "merely requiring generic computer implementation
fails to transform [Alice's] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention").
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concept[]," and then determines whether there is an "inventive concept" that
nonetheless transforms the patent-ineligible natural law into a patent-eligible
application thereof.26 Applying this test to Alice's claims, Justice Thomas
first found that they were directed to an abstract idea-the concept of
intermediated settlement, making it a patent-ineligible concept. 27 At step two,
Justice Thomas found that merely reciting the existence of a generic
computer was insufficient to convert Alice's patent-ineligible abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention.2 8
Citing Alice, lower courts have invalidated patents in almost two hundred
and fifty cases since June 2014.29 Mobile health-related patents have been
among those struck down,30 and lawyers have recognized the increased
difficulty of using patents to protect mobile health apps going forward.3 1
Although manufacturers of more complex wearable technologies may find it
easier to protect aspects of their products, makers of mobile health
applications that work with existing phones, tablets, or other technologies
will find it difficult to achieve comprehensive patent protection in the way
that most drugs or medical devices have.32
FDA Regulation. - For at least the last half century,33 the FDA has played
a central role in the regulation of health technologies of all kinds.3 4 Its
regulation of pharmaceuticals is particularly rigorous, requiring companies
to obtain premarket approvals of their technologies by demonstrating both
safety and efficacy of the compound in question.3 5 The FDA's regulation of

26. Id at 2355 (citations omitted).
27. Id at 2356.
28. Id at 2358.
29.
Robert R. Sachs, AliceStorm Update for Fall 2016, BLSKIBLOG (Oct. 19, 2016),
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/10/alicestorm-update-turbulence-and-troubles-.html.
30.
See, e.g., MobiHealthNews, What Have We Learnedfrom Four Years of Digital
Health
Patent
Fights?,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS
(Aug.
26,
2016),
http://www.mobihealthnews.concontent/what-have-we-leamed-four-years-digital-healthpatent-fights.
31.
See, e.g., Douglas H. Pearson et al., Are You Ready for Digital-Health Patent
Disputes?, JONES
DAY
DIGITAL
HEALTH
LAW
UPDATE
(Aug.
2015),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/6da3b83 8-43 1e-4e04-96f0-5c 15814e6fd4/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/929ac4d9-b70f-43b8-9776-5ee07cdd7bd l/
Digital%20Health/o2OVol%/`201%`20Issue%/`204.pdf Brian E. Ferguson & Anish R. Desai, The
Coming Patent War Over Wearable Technologies, WEIL GOTSHAL (Sept. 2, 2015),
http://www.weil.com/articles/the-coming-patent-war-over-wearable-technologies.
32.
Douglas H. Pearson et al., supra note 31 ("The [Alice] test has been applied with
devastating effect by district courts and the USPTO to invalidate patents or reject patent claims
on grounds that they claim no more than general computer implementations of abstract
ideas.").
33. Kefauver Harris Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
34. Cortez, Cohen & Kesselheim, supra note 9, at 372.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).
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devices-a broad category which encompasses everything from artificial
hearts, to tongue depressors, to blood tests-is more tailored and is graduated
on the basis of risk, with the highest-risk devices (like the artificial heart)
subject to full premarket approval procedures and the lowest-risk devices
(like tongue depressors) subject only to "general controls,"3 6 including
reporting and adherence to good manufacturing practices.37
By contrast, the FDA has largely avoided regulating traditional mobile
health technologies,38 opting most importantly only to regulate apps "whose
functionality could pose a risk to a patient's safety if the mobile app were not
to function as intended." 39 As in the case of traditional medical devices, the
FDA's oversight here is risk-based. The FDA has provided a number of
examples of apps which pose a "lower risk" to the public and, therefore, over
which it has decided to exercise enforcement discretion for the time being. 40
FDA regulation is often viewed by industry leaders as a hindrance to be
surmounted-a process that adds time and expense to the development of a
new medical technology, and is therefore a drag on innovation, not an
incentive in the way that patents are. 4 1However, inherent in the FDA's ability
to oversee the approval process is the ability to demand the development and
dissemination of information about new medical technologies. 42 Professor
Becky Eisenberg has most notably made this argument in the context of
pharmaceuticals, arguing that FDA regulation valuably promotes the

36. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2012); Replacement Heart Valve, 21 C.F.R. § 870.3925
(2015); 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2012); Tongue Depressor, 21 C.F.R. § 880.6230 (2015).
37. Id.
38. William M. Sage, Assembled Products:The Key to More Effective Competition and
Antitrust Oversight in Health Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 698-99 (2016); see also Mark
Sullivan, FDA Makes Official Its Hands-Off Approach To Regulating Health Apps and
Medical Software, VENTUREBEAT (Feb. 6, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/02/06/fdamakes-official-its-hands-off-approach-to-regulating-health-apps-and-medical-software/.
39.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, 4, 20-21 (Feb. 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/.. ./UCM263366.pdf. As a note, the FDA
has also declined to regulate apps it does not deem "medical devices." Specifically, the FDA
has designated a set of apps that it does not consider to be "medical devices" under the
statutory definition. These include apps that provide physicians access to electronic copies of
medical reference books, apps that are used for physician or patient training and education, or
apps that automate hospital processes like billing and shift management, to name a few. These
carve-outs were subsequently codified in large part in the 2 1st Century Cures Act. See 2 1st
Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060 (2016).
40.

U.S. FOOD &DRUGADMIN., supra note 39, at 23-26.

41.

INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA

510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS 20-22 (Theresa Wizemann ed. 2010).

42.

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
& TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007).

TELECOMM.
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"development of credible information about the effects of drugs." 43 This
insight extends to the device context as well.44 Although the lack of FDA
oversight in the mobile app context means that many companies will be able
to come to market more quickly and cheaply, it also means that information
about the quality and accuracy of their products will be comparatively
lacking.
Insurance Coverage. - Most traditional health care technologies are not
marketed or sold directly to patients, but are instead prescribed or
administered by a health care professional and purchased with the aid of
insurance.4 ' Insurers can therefore serve as intermediaries: by refusing to
cover technologies until more information about their efficacy has been
developed, they can force companies to produce information about their
quality, even beyond that required by the FDA.4'6 This can serve a valuable
role in many cases, such as when medical devices are studied in ideal
populations rather than populations which are representative of a disease's
sufferers. Therefore, insurance coverage is, in some ways, both innovationenhancing and access-enhancing. It enhances innovation just as FDA
regulation does, by requiring companies to study their products extensively
before selling them to consumers. And it enhances access by enabling
patients to afford expensive health technologies.
But most patient-facing mobile health technologies are marketed and sold
directly to patients, outside of the doctor-patient relationship and without the
insurer as intermediary.48 Helpfully, this does mean that many mobile health
apps will be priced affordably and will be accessible without the aid of
insurance.49 More problematically, it also means that the quality control
function of insurance coverage is not available for most mobile health
technologies."o Patients purchasing such apps cannot be sure that trusted
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Jessica Smith & Carla Medalia, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE: ECON AND STATISTICS
ADMIN., HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 3 (2014).
46.
See, e.g., Liz Richardson, HEALTH AFFAIRS POLICY BRIEF: ALIGNING FDA AND CMS
REVIEW

2-3 (Aug. 27, 2015).

47.
Id. at 3.
48.
Derek Newell, 5 Ways Mobile Apps Will Transform Healthcare, FORBES, (Jan. 26,
2017 12:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/20 12/06/04/5-ways-mobile-appswill-transform-healthcare/#17a0dl8d6509.
49.
Isabel de la Torre-Diez et al., Cost-Utility and Cost-Effectiveness Studies of
Telemedicine, Electronic, andMobile Health Systems in the Literature:A Systematic Review
21 TELEMEDICINE AND E-HEALTH 81, 82 (2015) (Most research studies in the literature have

concluded that telemedicine systems are cost-effective; however, in this article, two studies
have been found in which the cost-effectiveness of telemedicine is not an explicit conclusion).
50.

See generally NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, EXCHANGES PLAN MANAGEMENT

FUNCTION:
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physicians or expert intermediaries have signed off on their effectiveness,
and so they cannot be sure what the true risks and benefits of the products
are.
Patent law, FDA regulation, and insurance coverage simply do not operate
on most mobile health technologies in the way that they relate to
pharmaceuticals and traditional medical device products. Scholarly literature
has explored ways in which the combination of these areas of regulation
affects incentives to innovate in pharmaceuticals and traditional medical
devices." However, relatively little attention has been paid to the ways in
which the lack ofeach of these innovation policy levers may affect innovation
patterns in the mobile health sphere,5 2 a subject to which I now turn.
II.

MOBILE HEALTH RESPONSES TO THE INNOVATION POLICY VACUUM

In the mobile health space, traditional innovation policy levers, such as
patent law, FDA regulation, and insurance coverage, have all been turned
"off." What effect does this pattern have on companies seeking to innovate
in the mobile health space? In a large number of cases, the relative absence
of traditional innovation policy levers in the mobile health space has led
companies to make a choice.53 Either a company can engage in what scholars
have called "regulatory arbitrage"" and construct its business model in a way
that will enable it to evade regulatory scrutiny, or the company can choose to
emulate traditional medical device companies and undergo FDA and insurer

http://www.naic.org/documents/conmitteesb_relatedwpaccred
the quality control function of health insurance providers).

quality.pdf

(discussing

51.
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting FunctionalBalanceofPatents andDrug
Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFF. 119, 120-21 (2001); Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution
Reaches Pharmaceuticals:Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the PostGenomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 178; Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy:
Preservingthe Future ofPersonalizedMedicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1881, 1929 (2016).

52.
Importantly, the lack of these innovation policy levers is the "normal" case. Most
consumer products (including most apps) are not heavily regulated in the way that medical
technologies are. Viewed from that perspective, drugs and devices are the outliers. But it is
important not to view mobile health apps the same as other software products. Not only are
the potential implications for consumer well-being more like those in the traditional health
technology space, but here companies have the ability to choose between the regulatory
systems, as I will now explore.
53.
These two stories are not universal. In fact, it is likely that many small start-up
companies may proceed without detailed consideration of regulatory barriers that may be years
in the future. However, these are two prominent storylines with support from existing
literature and adjacent technologies.
54.
Victor Fleischer, RegulatoryArbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010); Jody Freeman
& Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1131,
1185 (2012); Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Healthcare Data
Protection,
17
YALE
J.
HEALTH
POL'Y
L.
&
ETHICS
1,

https://papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=277447 1 (forthcoming 2017).
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scrutiny for its products. In either case, the bottom line is that companies are
making business decisions shaped by the regulatory options they face.
A.

Regulatory Arbitrage

First, a large set of companies has chosen to pursue a strategy of
"regulatory arbitrage," in which the company will purposefully design its
technology in a way that minimizes or avoids regulatory scrutiny." Professor
Nicolas Terry has explored the idea of regulatory arbitrage in the context of
mobile health technologies and Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) protection." Most health data that is exchanged
through, and held by, traditional healthcare providers, such as physicians and
hospitals, is subject to HIPAA's protections for privacy and security. 7 Many
health technology companies (including pharmaceutical companies and
medical device manufacturers) working with these providers may similarly
be subject to HIPAA as business associates, by virtue of these connections."'
Many mobile health companies have instead chosen to design their
systems and interactions with patients to avoid collecting the kind of data, or
interfacing with the kind of entities, that would render their technology
subject to HIPAA protection.5 9 As a result, Professor Terry notes, "the vast
majority of health apps are not curated, sold, or implemented by HIPAA
'covered entities.""o Much of the health data collected by these apps is
therefore not protected by HIPAA, and consumers lack the associated privacy
and security protections.6
This regulatory arbitrage argument extends beyond the HIPAA context to
the innovation policy lever analysis described in Part I. A savvy company
that is aware of the FDA's decision to exercise enforcement discretion over
broad categories of mobile health technologies can construct its products in
ways that make them fall outside the FDA's current focus. 6 2 Keeping
development costs low by avoiding FDA regulation is likely to ensure a given
55.
More formally, Professor Victor Fleischer has defined regulatory arbitrage as "the
manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic
substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment." Fleischer, supra note 54, at 230.
56. Terry, supra note 54, at 44-47.
57. 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2002); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2002); see also The HIPAA PrivacyRule,
U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2017).

58.
59.
60.
61.

45 C.F.R. § 160 (2002); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2002).
Terry, supra note 54, at 38.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37-38.

62.

See generallyU.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS:
FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF (2015),

GUIDANCE

https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/.. ./ UCM263366.pdf.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2017

9

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 26 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3

Annals ofHealth Law

10

Vol. 26

app's affordability without insurance coverage. Although patents may still
not be readily available for these technologies, patents may be less essential
where the costs of development and time to market are low, as is often true
with mobile apps which do not need to surmount regulatory hurdles. 63
This contention-that mobile health companies observing the regulatory
landscape may choose to minimize the amount of regulatory scrutiny to
which they are subject-is descriptive, not normative. In this brief essay, I
take no position as to whether, on balance, these decisions are positive overall
for patients and society. If companies seeking to take advantage of the FDA's
enforcement discretion are truly making affordable, low-risk apps which may
be beneficial for patients, it would be a positive development. However, if
companies are seeking to repackage higher-risk apps in a way that is designed
only to avoid FDA scrutiny, risks to patients may increase. Alternatively, if
companies opt to develop entirely different, less impactful technologies to
avoid FDA scrutiny, patients may lose out on potential health benefits. It is
difficult to assess the relative contributions of these potential effects,
especially when the very fact of FDA enforcement discretion makes it
difficult to determine the size and scope of the mobile app market.
Mobile health technologies would not be the first example of regulatory
arbitrage in the health technology space, and other examples are more clearly
harmful.
Another recent example is from the field of diagnostic
technologies. 6 ' For decades, the FDA decided to exercise its enforcement
discretion regarding "laboratory-developed tests" or LDTs, those which are
"designed, manufactured, and used within a single laboratory."65 The FDA

63.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 15, at 1618-19, 1622-23 (discussing the characteristics
of the business method and software industries which encourage them to innovate without the
use of patents); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Badfor Business?,
16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275 (2000) (describing the expense of
patents that ultimately transfer a higher price for the consumer); see also SEC'Y'S ADVISORY
CoMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & Soc'Y, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS
AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS To GENETIC TESTS 1 (2010)

[hereinafter, SACGHS REPORT ON GENE PATENTS] ("[T]he prospect of patent protection of a
genetic research discovery does not play a significant role in motivating scientists to conduct
genetic research.").
64.
See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LDTs),

GUIDANCE
(2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM416685.pdf
[hereinafter LDT

DRAFT

DRAFT GUIDANCE].

65.

Id. at 5. Importantly, this does not mean that only one laboratory in the country

performs a given test. It certainly can, but it often does not. Many of the most widely available
tests are LDTs, precisely because they are simple for every lab to develop and perform
independently. Routine laboratory tests like a complete blood count or Pap smear typically
qualify as LDTs for this reason. These tests are performed in hundreds or even thousands of
labs around the country, but they can still qualify as LDTs as long as there is no test
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only exercised its authority over diagnostic tests where a testing company
opted to produce a test kit for sale and use in laboratories around the
country.66 Companies responded to the incentives created by this scheme,'6 7
and estimates suggest that the majority of genetic tests are currently offered
as LDTs. 6' However, the FDA has become concerned about increased risk
to patients from many of the newer LDTs, and we may see increased
regulation in this area going forward.69
B.

Regulatory Preference

Regulatory arbitrage is only one side of the story. Rather than design their
businesses to avoid FDA scrutiny, some companies have chosen to pursue
the opposite strategy, leveraging their regulatory sophistication to move fully
into the wearable medical device category.70 These companies welcome
FDA regulation and view it as a means of both staving off competition in the
market and obtaining a stamp of approval that other companies will lack.7
Each of these rationales deserves further explication.
First, the FDA is a strong gatekeeper for traditional medical
technologies. 72 No pharmaceutical or risky medical device will come to
market without FDA clearance .7 As such, companies running the FDA
gauntlet can expect that would-be competitors will also need to expend time

&

manufacturer who sells a diagnostic product to other labs.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012) (The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act gives the FDA
the authority to regulate any medical device, defined as "an instrument, apparatus, implement,
machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including
any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease."); SACGHS
REPORT ON GENE PATENTS, supra note 63, at 61.
67.
PRIORITIES FOR PERSONALIZED MED., PRESIDENT'S COUNSEL OF ADVISORS ON SCI.
TECH., 38-39 (2008), http://web.archive.org/web/200901170605 16/http://www.ostp.gov/
galleries/PCAST/pcast report v2.pdf.
68.
SACGHS REPORT ON GENE PATENTS, supra note 63, at 61.
69.
LDT DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 64, at 7; see also generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., THE PUB. HEALTH EVIDENCE FOR OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS: 20
CASE
STUDIES
(Nov.
16,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/downfloads/AboutFDA/
ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM472777.pdf.
70.
See Julie Steenhuysen, Beyond Fitbit. The Quest to Develop Medical-Grade
Wearables, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthwearables-insight-idUSKBNOU10G120151218 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
71.
Bradley Merrill Thompson, SHOULD MHEALTH COMPANIES WANT REGULATION? 67 (June 2014), http://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2014/06/37764_mobilehn4b.pdf.
72.
See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA's ROLE IN ENSURING AMERICAN
PATIENTS HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE AND EFFECTIVE MEDICAL DEVICE TECHNOLOGY (2015),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/
UCM457151.pdf.
73.
See id.
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and money to complete the relevant regulatory processes, and cannot simply
free-ride on the first company's investment in clinical trials. 4 In some ways,
this gatekeeper function of the FDA partially replicates the function of the
patent system. 75 To be sure, it is weaker in some ways (especially for followon devices proceeding through the 510(k) pathway), but in others it is
stronger.76 For instance, the FDA gatekeeping authority is automatically
enforced-companies do not need to expend resources searching for
potential patent infringers on the market, as the FDA will do it for them.77 If
patents are less commonly available for mobile health companies, FDA
approval may be one way of partially regaining their function.
Second, FDA approval carries with it an imprimatur of safety and
effectiveness that can be highly valuable to a company.78 Companies can
avoid publicly releasing particular types of information, including trade
secrets about how their products work, if the FDA has viewed all the relevant
information and approved the product on that basis. 79 The FDA is highly
respected by both the public and experts in the relevant fields,"o meaning that
its approval decisions are both trusted and important to other decision makers
within the health care context."' If consumers have a choice between two
products-one FDA-approved, recommended by their physician and paid for
by their insurer, and another with more limited functionality and no
recommendation from a trusted intermediary-they may be inclined toward
the former.
One example of this approach is Empatica, a company developing a series
of devices that measure and monitor a range of vital signs.8 2 Empatica's
flagship product, a smart watch called Embrace, was designed primarily for

74. See id. (Noting generally that every new medical technology goes through the relevant
regulatory processes).
75.
See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals
-Do WeReally NeedBoth?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 419, 449-50 (2012).

76.

Id. at 430-32 (looking at similarities and differences between the patent system and

FDA).

77.
Id. (discussing how the FDA doesn't allow generic drugs to enter the market for a
period of 5 years).
78.

See Device Denials, Approvals and Clearances,U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 7,

2016),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/
DeviceApprovalsandClearances/ (noting that FDA approval shows that a medical device is
safe and effective for its intended use).
79.
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, ConfidentialityLaws and Secrecy in
MedicalResearch: Improving PublicAccess To Data on Drug Safety, 26-2 HEALTH AFFAIRS
483, 484-85 (2007).
80.

81.
82.

DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER 12 (2010).

Id.
Embrace: Monitors Seizures, Sleep and Physical Activity, EMPATICA (2017),

https://www.empatica.com/product-enbrace (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
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patients with epilepsy.83 Ideally, Embrace will be able to alert epilepsy
patients and caregivers of seizures. 4 Rather than just coming up with an app
that tracks sleep and activity or using existing technologies with capabilities
in this area (such as fitness trackers like Fitbit or Jawbone), Empatica has
invested in its own complex technology." Most importantly, Empatica plans
on gaining FDA approval for its products, particularly those which it hopes
will be useful in clinical trials." Other companies developing epilepsy
sensors, like Smart Monitor, are also conducting studies in preparation for
FDA review. 7
In explaining two of the key ways in which companies have chosen to
respond to the landscape of innovation incentives facing mobile health
companies, the above stories tell only one side of the innovation puzzle.
Equally as important are the decisions being made by agencies about when,
why, and how to regulate these technologies. Most interestingly, in the
mobile health space there have been several examples of interagency
collaboration on innovation and regulation.
III.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION TO SHAPE MOBLE HEALTH
INNOVATION

It is not enough to consider the choices made by any individual
administrative agency in the service of innovation and regulation. Their
coordinated actions must be considered. Several agencies, which nonetheless
lack formally shared regulatory authority over the innovation space, have
begun to collaborate in the mobile health space to promote incentives for
innovation and regulation.
Much of the leading administrative law
scholarship on interagency relationships speaks in terms of coordination,88
where the primary goal in situations involving agencies with interacting
jurisdictional assignments is to minimize inconsistency.8 9 But it is worth
distinguishing mere coordinationfrom a relationship that rises further to the
level of collaboration,in which agencies actively work together, exchanging

83.

Advanced

Research

on

Human

Behavior,

EMPATICA

(2017),

https://www.empatica.com/science (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Steenhuysen, supra note 70.
87.
Id.
88.
See generally, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 54; see generally Jennifer Nou,
Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARv. L. REV. 421 (2015); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K.
Rai, FixingInnovation Policy:A StructuralPerspective, 77 G.W. L. REv. 1, 21 (2008) (noting

that "govermnent agencies often fail to coordinate innovation policy, resulting in incoherence
and perhaps bald inconsistency.").
89.

Freeman & Rossi, supra note 54, at 1146-48.
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information and resources, to achieve shared goals.90 My focus going
forward is on this category of true collaboration, although the personal and
institutional relationships supporting relationships of mere coordination are
often a precondition for collaboration as well.
In another work, 9 ' I argued that health-related agencies within the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), such as the FDA, Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and National Institutes of Health
(NIH) engage in collaboration to perform a number of functions.92 They
share information among themselves that can be used to set priorities for
research and regulation, engage jointly in research that advances agency
priorities, and make decisions more efficiently about product approvals and
insurance coverage.93 Agency collaboration is similarly present in the mobile
health context, although thus far observable collaboration has taken a
different form: collaboration between traditional health-related agencies and
traditional enforcement agencies. 94
In 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) worked with HHS and
FDA to create and make publicly available an online tool for developers of
mobile health apps. 95 The goal of the tool is to "help the developers
understand what federal laws and regulations might apply to their apps. "96
The agencies created a clear user interface that marches developers through
a series of questions about their product, at each stage providing information
about laws that might affect the choice one way or the other. 97 As one
example, the app asks developers if their product is "intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment

90.
To be sure, the literature itself-rather than just the terminology it applies-is
concerned with both. Requirements for interagency consultation frequently fall into the
coordination category, while joint rulemakings are often closer to collaboration, and there are
instances of true collaboration. Id. at 1157, 1163, 1166.
91.
Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 23 (unpublished manuscript)
(draft on file with author).
92. See generally Sarah Fellay, Changing the Rules ofHealth Care:Mobile Health and
Challenges for
Regulation,
AM.
ENTERPRISE
INST.
(Aug.
4,
2014),
http://www.aei.org/publication/changing-the-rules-of-health-care-mobile-health-andchallenges-for-regulation/.
93. Sachs, supra note 91.
94. See generally Fellay, supra note 92.
95.
Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool, FED. TRADE COMM'N. (Apr. 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-health-apps-interactivetool.
96. FTC Releases New Guidancefor Developers of Mobile Health Apps, FED. TRADE
COMM'N., (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/04/ftcreleases-new-guidance-developers-mobile-health-apps.
97. Id.
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or prevention of disease."98 If so, they may be a medical device subject to
FDA regulation.99 These laws-including the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
HIPAA, the FTC Act, and others-are the very same ones agencies have
made choices to avoid or embrace.'o The new information from the FTC,
HHS, and FDA puts these companies on notice and provides certainty as they
move forward.'
This questionnaire is the first example of explicit, public collaboration
between agencies in the mobile health space. However, I do not believe it is
the first example of collaboration. Collaboration between agencies may take
place publicly, as with this questionnaire or as with initiatives like the
FDA/CMS parallel review program for medical devices. 0 2 Alternatively,
collaboration may take place behind the scenes. While the fact of the
collaboration itself may not be public, the existence of collaboration may be
the best explanation for a given action taken by an agency-it may be acting
to implement another agency's priorities.
In the mobile health space, behind-the-scenes collaboration may be taking
place in the context of FTC enforcement actions. To date, the FTC has taken
action against a number of mobile health apps it argues are engaging in
deceptive advertising practices.1 03 The FTC's August 2015 actions against a
set of mobile apps that claimed to be able to detect melanoma once users took
pictures of their moles' 04 is one such example here. Like many federal
agencies, the FTC is under-resourced and must set priorities for enforcement.
The FDA and FTC have a long-standing relationship of coordination on
enforcement actions, o0 and the mobile health space may be the latest
example of their work in this area. Since the FDA has opted to exercise their
enforcement discretion regarding many of these technologies, FDA officials
noticing egregious examples of health-related advertising may request FTC
involvement. 0 6 Of note is the FDA's similar relationship with the SEC, in

98.
99.
100.
101.

Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool, supra note 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.

102.

Program for Parallel Review of Medical Devices, 81 Fed. Reg. 73113, 73114 (Oct.

24, 2016).
103.
Fed. Trade Comm'n., "Melanoma Detection" App Sellers Barredfrom Making
Deceptive Health Claims (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-

releases/2015/08/melanoma-detection-app-sellers-barred-making-deceptive-health.
104.
Id.
105.
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 54, at 1162; see also Anne V. Maher & Lesley Fair,
The FTC'sRegulation ofAdvertising, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 589, 602 (2010).

106.
Cf DAVID C. VLADECK, DIRECTOR, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION,
COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE NUTRITION ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM FOR THE DIETARY SUPPLEMENT
INDUSTRY: PRIORITIES FOR DIETARY SUPPLEMENT ADVERTISING ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 22,
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the context of publicly-held pharmaceutical companies who fail to disclose
relevant information or who publicly misrepresent their dealings with the
FDA. 0 7

There are good reasons to make interagency collaborations, both of this
and other types, more transparent. First, transparency about agency priorities
and enforcement is important to ensure public accountability. These agencies
already issue guidance documents (such as the FDA's guidance documents
on the regulation of mobile health apps) and rulemakings for public comment
for similar reasons. 0 Second and possibly more importantly, transparency
about areas of collaborative focus helps scientists and the industry in general
plan for the future. The primary point of these collaborations is to improve
both regulatory priority-setting and the regulatory process itself, and
scientists who are aware of these priorities will make decisions about what
technologies to develop and how those technologies will come to market in
a more informed, appropriate fashion.
Of course, in many cases collaboration does not occur, even where it might
be desirable. There are a range of reasons why this might be true. It may be
that one agency's governing statute formally precludes its action or even its
collaboration with other agencies on specific issues. For instance, the FDA
may hope to regulate in an area, but be hamstrung by its own jurisdictional
limitations, as some of the functions implemented by mobile apps may fall
under its "practice of medicine" exception.1 0 9
More commonly, though, the explanation for the failure to collaborate may
be less about legal barriers and more about practical obstacles. It is costlyin terms of time, energy, and agency resources, if not in terms of financial
resources-to develop and maintain interagency collaborations."1 0 Unless
staff members have support from agency leaders, it may be difficult for them
to identify their counterparts in the relevant agencies, formulate plans for
collaboration, and implement those plans.
Helpfully, there are a range of potential procedural mechanisms that could
be employed to enhance cooperation between different administrative
agencies for the purpose of promoting both innovation and regulation. Many

2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicstatements/priorities-dietarysupplement-advertising-enforcement/091022vladeckcrnspeech.pdf.
107.
Liora Sukhatme, Deterring Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug
Approval Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1234-36 (2007).
108.
See generally, CARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER KILMARTIN, AND EVAN MENDELSON,
UNIV. OF PA. LAw SCH., TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING
PROCESS: A NONPARTISAN PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION TASK FORCE REPORT (July 2008).

109.

See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52
L. REv. 427, 430 (2015).
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 88, at 23-25.
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110.
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of these tools also have the advantage of directing cooperation to occur in
ways that are driven by top-down goals, purposefully and deliberately, rather
than opportunistically. Two different examples will illustrate some of the
institutional design options available on this issue.
One potential procedural mechanism draws heavily from a proposal first
advanced by Professors Arti Rai & Stuart Benjamin, who suggest the creation
of an innovation regulator within the executive branch.i' They consider the
advantages (and disadvantages) of centralizing an innovation office and
housing it within the Executive Branch, arguing quite rightly that the
decentralization we observe at present is a significant problem from an
innovation perspective.112 Interestingly, in keeping with my arguments
regarding transparency above, Rai & Benjamin would create a regulator with
both "an obligation and an incentive to operate transparently.""1 3 This
proposal is especially well-suited to innovation in mobile health, where
potential innovation concerns span multiple independent agencies. 114
Creating a central innovation office within the White House or even within
an existing White House Office, such as the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, would be a particularly timely act. Over the past few
years, President Obama invested in a series of biomedical research initiatives
which all bring together different administrative agencies for innovation
purposes."' The BRAIN Initiative, the Precision Medicine Initiative, and the
Cancer Moonshot are all centrally driven programs. 11' Congress signaled its

111.
Id. at6.
112. Id. at 57.
113.
Id.at78.
114.
Sachs, supra note 91. Concerning subagencies within HHS-such as CMS, FDA,
and NIH-I have elsewhere suggested that creating a separate officer within HHS may be
prudent. This proposal may strike a middle-ground between complete centralization and
complete decentralization, allowing the officer to develop deeper, more personal connections
with the material than would housing them within the executive branch, while at the same time
minimizing some of the difficulties of decentralization. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 88, at
56-58. Alternatively, creating individual subject matter officers within a more centralized
executive branch office may functionally replicate these concerns.
115.
Fact Sheet: BRAIN Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF PRESS SEC'Y (Apr. 2,
2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/02/fact-sheet-braininitiative [hereinafter Brain Initiative]; Fact Sheet: Vice PresidentBiden Delivers Cancer
MoonshotReport, Announces Public and Private Sector Actions to Advance CancerMoonshot
Goals, THE WHITEHOUSE OFF. OF VP. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2016/10/17/fact-sheet-vice-president-biden-delivers-cancer-moonshot-report
[hereinafter Vice President Biden Delivers Cancer Moonshot Report].
116.
See The Precision Medicine Initiative, THE WHITE

HOUSE (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/precision-medicine (last visited Jan. 30, 2017); BRAIN
Initiative, supra note 115; Vice President Biden Delivers Cancer Moonshot Report, supra note

115.
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intention to continue these programs going forward,"' and a centralized
innovation regulator could pull in relevant administrative agencies as
necessary.
A second, very different approach would be to involve Congress in the
development of innovation policy in this area. Congress might consider
creating a non-partisan, independent organization along the lines of
MedPAC, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission."" MedPAC is
composed of independent experts who advise Congress on potential reforms
to Medicare, broadly speaking.11 9 These experts are drawn primarily from
academia, health care providers, and the health care industry more
generally.1 20 Such a commission could not only review the individual actions
of administrative agencies as they relate to innovation policy, but it could
also review the ways in which these agencies relate to each other.
This idea is not merely speculative. An early draft of the 21s Century
Cures Act would have created a national Medical Product Innovation
Advisory Commission based on MedPAC. The proposed Commission
would "analyze medical product innovation in the United States and
recommend policies to accelerate the discovery, development, and delivery
of new medical products."l2 1 As such, the Commission would not only be
specifically tasked with reviewing policies of the NIH, FDA, CMS, and other
agencies, but would also be tasked with "review[ing] the interactionof
Federal agencies with respect to the discovery, development, and delivery of
new medical products and how such interactions influence medical product
innovation. "122
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this essay, I considered the ways in which the innovation policy
landscape for mobile health technologies affects both the companies
choosing whether and how to invest in this space and the administrative

117.
Tanya Somanader, Three Letters That Explain Why PresidentObama Is Signing the
Cures
Act,
WHITE
HOUSE
BLOG
(Dec.
13,
2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/12/12/3 -letters-explain-why-president-obamasigning-cures-act.
118.
See MedPAC, About MedPAC (2016), http://www.medpac.gov/-about-medpac-.

119.

See, e.g., MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY (March

2016).
120.
Cf Benjamin & Rai, supra note 88, at 54 ("[A]n innovation regulator that improved
congressional decisionmaking would appear quite attractive.").
121.
21st Century Cures Act Discussion Document § 229A (Jan. 26, 2015),
https://energycomnerce.house.gov/sites/
republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/1 14/Analysis/Cures/20 150127-CuresDiscussion-Document.pdf.
122. Id. at § 229A(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol26/iss2/3

18

Sachs: Mobile Health Innovation and Interagency Coordination

2017

Mobile Health Innovation

19

agencies setting and implementing the relevant policies. I argued that
scholars and policymakers ought to look beyond the capacities of
administrative agencies individually to contribute to innovation policy, and
instead ought to focus on the potential for collaboration across agencies.
There are key areas of collaboration that are almost entirely unexplored, and
we ought to consider procedural options for encouraging or requiring such
collaboration. The ultimate point, though, is broader. The ways in which
these agencies, which have distinct missions regarding overlapping subject
matter, collaborate may provide a way forward for innovation policy law and
scholarship.
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